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THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY
IN COMPLIANCE
Sean J. Griffith*
ABSTRACT
In this symposium Essay, I apply insights from philosophy and
psychology to argue that modes of achieving compliance that focus on
technology undermine, and are undermined by, modes of achieving
compliance that focus on culture. Insisting on both may mean succeeding at
neither. How an organization resolves this apparent contradiction in
program design, like the broader question of optimal corporate governance
arrangements, is highly idiosyncratic. Firms should therefore be accorded
maximum freedom in designing their compliance programs, rather than
being forced by enforcement authorities into a set of de facto mandatory
compliance structures.
INTRODUCTION
It is a pleasure to address this symposium on the Role of Technology in
Compliance in Financial Services.1 In doing so, I will step back and try to
start at the beginning. This means starting at first principles and asking the
basic “what is” questions.
Contemporary considerations of technology rarely begin at first
principles. Technology is all around us. It frames our interactions with the
world—through smartphone screens and computer monitors—to such a
degree that we no longer notice it. Although we are always looking for new
ways to use technology, we are perhaps too familiar with it to ask what it is
or what it might mean for us. What is technology? Is it simply the next “app”?
Or is it something deeper and, perhaps, more dangerous?
The most profound thinker on the essence of technology is Martin
Heidegger. Heidegger’s philosophical preoccupation was the uncovering of
being—that is, the experience of things as they are prior to any attempt to
* T.J. Maloney Chair and Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Ethan Leib for
his comments on an earlier draft of this Essay. The viewpoints and any errors contained herein are
mine alone.
1. Sean J. Griffith, T.J. Maloney Chair and Professor of Law at Fordham Law School, Speaker
at the Brooklyn Law School Symposium: The Role of Technology in Compliance in Financial
Services: An Indispensable Tool as well as a Threat? (Mar. 4, 2016).
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analyze them.2 In the modern era, Heidegger argues, technology has played
a central role in the covering up of being.3
A common view of technology is that it is mere instrumentality, a tool
that is entirely within our control. But this does not fully capture the essence
of technology, which, according to Heidegger, lies in “enframing”4—that is,
the extraction of use and purpose out of mere being.5 Thus, for Heidegger,
technology is simultaneously a tool and a threat. A tool because it does
indeed bring forth a multitude of means,6 but a threat because, once being is
conceived in this way, it can no longer be experienced as it simply is.7
Most of us, of course, do not often think of technology in this way. We
take for granted that it is simply a tool to make our lives easier, to facilitate
interactions across great distances, and to increase productivity. But this is
proof that we are in its thrall. Technology does not merely create
convenience; it constructs the world we experience. And it constructs us.8
In this Essay, I will draw on these insights to describe the role of
technology in compliance. My argument is that by technologizing
compliance, we risk losing sight of an organization’s culture. Culture is
difficult to operationalize or even define precisely.9 Yet culture reveals itself
2. SeeMark Blitz, Understanding Heidegger on Technology, NEWATLANTIS, Winter 2014, at
63 (“Heidegger made the bold claim that Western thought from Plato onward had ignored the
fundamental question of what it means for something to be—to be present for us prior to any
philosophical or scientific analysis.”).
3. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY, reprinted in BASIC
WRITINGS 311 (David Farrell Krell, ed., 1993) (“Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to
technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it.”).
4. Id. at 324–25 (defining the German word “Gestell” to mean “enframing”).
5. See id. at 319 (“[W]hat is decisive in techné does not lie at all in making and manipulating
nor in the using of means, but rather in the aforementioned revealing [of what can ‘turn out now
one way and now another.’]”).
6. See id. at 322 (“Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways
of revealing. But the revealing never simply comes to an end.”).
7. Modern science serves this vision of technology:
Modern science’s way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable
coherence of forces . . . . Because physics, indeed already as pure theory, sets nature up
to exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in advance, it orders its experiments
precisely for the purpose of asking whether and how nature reports itself when set up in
this way . . . . Modern physics is the herald of enframing.
Id. at 326–27. The result of this process is that: “precisely nowhere does man today any longer
encounter himself, i.e., his essence.” Id. at 332.
8. See Blitz, supra note 2, at 75 (“Heidegger points out that technology has become the world
. . . . Technology reigns, and we therefore forget being altogether and our own essential freedom—
we no longer even realize the world we have lost.”).
9. Studies of organizational culture tend to be highly descriptive but typically agree that culture
is a key factor in the organization’s success. See, e.g., KIM S. CAMERON & ROBERT E. QUINN,
DIAGNOSING AND CHANGING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE (3d ed. 2011) (describing corporate
culture according to a four-factor matrix of flexible v. hierarchical and internal-oriented v. external-
oriented); ROBERT F. HURLEY, THE DECISION TO TRUST (2012) (focusing on how organizations
build cultures of trust); EDGAR H. SCHEIN, THE CORPORATE CULTURE SURVIVAL GUIDE (rev. ed.
2009) (describing methods of diagnosing corporate culture).
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through art, a mode of revealing that for Heidegger was extremely different
from technology.10 And recent work in social psychology has demonstrated
the power of culture in changing organizational behavior.11
My central claim in this Essay is that we would be better off conceiving
of compliance as an art rather than as a technology and leaving the design of
compliance programs to firms rather than enforcement authorities. Because
technological compliance inevitably undermines organizational culture and
because a culture of compliance may be similarly incompatible with a
technological approach, enforcement authorities and organizations invite
failure by insisting on both elements in compliance programs. The best
compliance program for any one organization will be unique and non-
generalizable. The authorities should vigorously enforce the law, but they
should stop engaging in program design and instead allow organizations the
freedom to design the program best suited to their unique circumstances.
From this introduction, the Essay proceeds as follows. Part I addresses
the role of technology in compliance, emphasizing how the deployment of
technology tends to transform broader notions of compliance into a narrower
concept focused essentially on efficient policing. Part II discusses
organizational culture as an alternative means of motivating proper conduct
within the organization. Part III points out the contradictions between these
two approaches to compliance and emphasizes the role of enforcement
authorities in embedding these contradictions in compliance programs. Part
IV suggests a way out of the contradiction by allowing firms greater freedom
to design and implement compliance as they see fit, free from implicit and
explicit enforcement mandates. The Essay then closes with a brief summary
and conclusion.
I. TECHNOLOGY IN COMPLIANCE
Compliance is the means by which firms adapt the behavior of their
agents to the relevant nexus of legal, regulatory, and social norms.12Although
it is possible to conceive of many approaches to compliance, U.S.
enforcement authorities insist that every “effective” program contains seven
common elements. The list, contained in the federal Sentencing Guidelines
for Organizations (the “Sentencing Guidelines”), includes: (1) the
establishment of rules and standards to prevent and detect misconduct; (2)
high-level oversight of and engagement with the firm’s compliance program;
10. Like technology, art reveals being, but unlike technology, art does so without measuring and
molding being into an infinitely plastic “standing-reserve.” See HEIDEGGER, supra note 3, at 322–
23 (on the transformation of nature into “standing-reserve”), 339 (on poetry as a mode of revealing).
Heidegger made this point by juxtaposing the vision of the Rhine River as it appears in Hölderlin’s
poetry and as it appears, dammed, as a source of power at the heart of German industry. Id. at 321.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2075, 2082 (2016).
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(3) due care in hiring; (4) communication and training; (5) monitoring,
auditing, and testing; (6) alignment of incentives; and (7) appropriate
remediation.13 Companies have a strong incentive to adopt compliance
programs featuring these seven elements, because doing so promises
mitigation of the company’s “Culpability Score” at sentencing,14 or more
realistically, gentler treatment at the hands of the authorities in prosecuting
and settling the case.15
Although technology is used in many compliance functions—from
automated internal hotlines to computer-based training modules—perhaps
the most advanced application of technology to compliance is through the
monitoring, auditing, and testing function.16 Financial firms currently use
technology to monitor transactions and block restricted trades.17
Furthermore, the consensus view, at least among compliance officers at large
financial institutions, is that the next step in compliance technologywill come
from applying “big data” tools to existing surveillance technologies. For
example, the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) of Goldman Sachs recently
acknowledged that his office captures more information via voice and data
surveillance than it can currently analyze.18 The challenge, in his view, lies
in finding technologies to put the information to use.19 Likewise, the CCO of
Morgan Stanley recently remarked, “we are all in the same boat in this in
terms of trying to use big data providers . . . to pull together lots of
information from lots of different data sources within the organizations.”20
“Big data” technology, the CCO emphasized, is the technology that led to the
identification of the Boston Marathon bombers.21 It is also the same
technology the NSA uses in its mass surveillance programs.22
13. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2011).
14. See id. § 8C2.5(f).
15. See generally Griffith, supra note 12, at 2086–92.
16. SeeKenneth Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age,
88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 674 (2010) (describing the large and increasing market for compliance-
technology products).
17. For example, programs exist to screen clients against sanctions lists and to erect barriers
against other prohibited trades. See, e.g., Bridger Insight XG, Streamline Regulatory Compliance,
Protect Your Business, and Increase Revenue, LEXISNEXIS RISK SOLUTIONS, http://www.lexis
nexis.com/risk/products/bridger-insight.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (promoting software
product as “a fully integrated compliance platform”).
18. See Symposium, The Changing Face of Corporate Compliance and Corporate Governance,
21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 55 (2016) (CCO noting that “every month we record, if you
played it end to end, ten years’ worth of voice”).
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. See id. On the use of big data techniques in that investigation, see e.g., Mike Wheatley, FBI
Uses Big Data & Crowdsourcing to Hunt the Boston Bomber, SILICON ANGLE (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://siliconangle.com/blog/2013/04/17/fbi-uses-big-data-crowdsourcing-to-hunt-the-boston-
bomber/.
22. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, How the U.S. Uses Technology to Mine More Data More
Quickly, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/us/revelations-give-
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The rush to use big data to improve the policing function of compliance
is a movement that generates its own momentum. According to the
Sentencing Guidelines, monitoring, auditing, and testing is a minimum
requirement of any “effective” compliance program.23 Any program that
lacks this element will not receive a mitigated sentence or prosecutorial
deference. Likewise, any firm that has implemented monitoring, auditing,
and testing to some degree, but that trails peer firms in the sophistication of
this element, is equally unlikely to receive much in the way of mitigation or
deference. Where Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley lead, other financial
firms must follow. Recognizing this trend, an industry has sprouted up
around the effort to push firms toward “regtech”—that is, the development
and implementation of technologies to address regulatory and compliance
problems.24 Plainly, there are clear benefits to implementing an efficient
policing function. If a computer program could have instantly alerted
JPMorgan’s compliance or risk officers that the size of the positions taken by
some of its traders did not match the value of those positions reported to the
firm, the London Whale trading fiasco could have been averted.25
But turning compliance into a policing function means turning the
business organization into a police state. The downside, captured vividly in
art and literature, is that no one wants to live in a police state.26 A recent
Financial Times article on workplace monitoring reached the same
conclusion: “Even when employers are open and clear about what they
monitor and why, they risk giving the impression that they do not trust their
own staff. If you act like you cannot trust them, you should not be surprised
look-at-spy-agencys-wider-reach.html?&_r=0; see also Meta S. Brown, NSA Mass Surveillance:
Biggest Big Data Story, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2015, 10:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/meta
brown/2015/08/27/nsa-mass-surveillance-biggest-big-data-story/#2715e4857a0b678b0f439acc.
23. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
24. See Kristen Silverberg et al., Regtech in Financial Services: Technology Solutions for
Compliance and Reporting, INST. OF INT’L FIN. (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.iif.com/publication/
research-note/regtech-financial-services-solutions-compliance-and-reporting.
25. See, e.g., Spencer P. Patton, Archangel Problems: The SEC and Corporate Liability, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 1717, 1721–26 (2014) (discussing the 2012 London Whale debacle in the context of SEC
enforcement policy).
26. See, e.g., GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). Orwell describes the
technological capabilities of the paradigmatic police-state as follows:
Any sound that Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked
up by [the monitoring device]; moreover, so long as he remained within the field of vision
which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of
course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How
often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was
guesswork.
Id. at 4. If anything, the surveillance technology presently available surpasses the tools imagined by
Orwell because big data does not require a human watcher to perform the surveillance. Big data
merely requires a computer and an algorithm to collect and analyze disparate pieces of information
in order to predict patterns and potential violations.
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when they act like they cannot be trusted.”27 Pervasive surveillance destroys
morale, a critical component of organizational cohesiveness or “culture,” and
ironically may lead to further misconduct within the organization.28
II. THE CULTURAL ALTERNATIVE
Organizational culture is the successful coordination of group norms with
individual choices—the individual adoption of a larger set of values and
beliefs that, once adopted, become ingrained and non-negotiable.29 The
values are not imposed; rather they are adopted. This is not an act of policing,
but rather a process of persuasion. Ultimately, individuals make their own
choices from a shared set of values between the individual and the
organization. To thrive thus requires willing participation, a shared belief in
the mission of the group and in the means chosen to achieve it.30 Employee
morale is an integral element not only of a thriving business organization—
dispirited workers tend not to excel at their jobs—it is also an essential
element of culture.
Pioneering research into how culture motivates employee conduct in
business organizations was carried out in 1994 by Lynne Paine, who argued
that a values and integrity approach is more effective than an approach based
on internal policing.31 The key, Paine argued, was getting employees to adopt
the organization’s values because they saw them as consistent with their
own.32 She made this argument through examples ranging from aerospace
and defense contractors to healthcare providers to electronics manufacturers.
Each corporation she examined defined organizational values such as
honesty and respect, and used those values as a framework for building
corporate culture.
A 1999 survey by Trevino and co-authors into what works in compliance
and ethics programs confirmed the Paine hypothesis. The Trevino study
surveyed 10,000 employees at six different corporations about their
compliance and ethics programs. The results demonstrated that values-based
programs had fewer reports of unethical conduct, higher levels of ethical
27. See, e.g., Sarah O’Connor, Workplace Surveillance is Sparking a Cyber Rebellion, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 19, 2016, 10:28 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/8c52aff6-bdda-11e5-9fdb-87b8d1
5baec2.
28. See generally Todd Haugh, SOX on Fish: A New Harm of Overcriminalization, 109 NW. U.
L. REV. 835 (2015); Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV.
1191 (2015).
29. See SCHEIN, supra note 9, at 27 (“Culture is a pattern of shared tacit assumptions that was
learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”).
30. See id. at 2627.
31. See generally Lynn Sharp Paine,Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Mar.–Apr. 1994.
32. See id. at 112.
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awareness, and greater reporting than compliance-based programs.33 The
study found that culture is more important than program design in inducing
compliant behavior.34 The study identified the elements of culture as
“leadership, reward systems, perceived fairness, ethics as a topic of
conversation in the organization, employee authority structures, and an
organizational focus that communicates care for employees and the
community.”35
In 2005, Tyler and Bladder compared the effects of “command-and-
control” approaches and “self-regulatory” approaches on rule following
within organizations.36 Through a two-stage study of employer and
supervisor attitudes towards conduct within the organization, the authors
found that self-regulatory models seem to be superior to command-and-
control models and further that “[e]mployees’ . . . perceived congruence of
their personal values with those of the organization, were the primary factors
shaping their rule adherence.”37 Likewise, although command-and-control
variables correlate with the reporting of misconduct, self-regulatory variables
had greater predictive value.38 The authors conclude from this study that
group-engagement models, aimed at inculcating self-regulatory norms, may
be more successful at changing organizational behavior than command-and-
control compliance systems.39
In subsequent work, Tyler and co-authors emphasize procedural fairness
and dignity values in producing compliant behavior, arguing that “employees
will comply and act ethically if they view management as legitimate and see
managerial policies as congruent with their own moral values,” and,
relatedly, that “employees are most likely to believe that management is
legitimate and management policy moral when they believe that
organizational procedures are fair.”40 Ultimately, the authors contend,
successful organizational cultures are more likely to prevent rogue actors
than command-and-control systems for three reasons:
33. Linda K. Trevino et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What
Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 13637 tbl.2 (1999); accordGary R. Weaver & Linda K. Trevino,
Compliance and Values Oriented Ethics Programs: Influences on Employees’ Attitudes and
Behavior, 9 BUS. ETHICS Q. 315, 333 (1999) (finding association between organizational values
and employee willingness to report misconduct).
34. Trevino et al., supra note 33, at 144.
35. Id. at 141.
36. See Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Can Business Effectively Regulate Employee
Conduct? The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work Settings, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1143, 1153
(2005).
37. Id. at 1148.
38. See id. at 1153.
39. See id. at 1154; accord TOMR.TYLER,WHY PEOPLEOBEYTHELAW (Princeton Univ. Press
2006).
40. Tom R. Tyler, John W. Dienhart & Terry Thomas, The Ethical Commitment to Compliance:
Building Value-Based Cultures, 50 CAL. MGMT. REV. 31, 33 (2008); accord Josh Bowers & Paul
H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims of Occasional Conflicts of
Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 212 (2012).
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First, in a culture where transparent procedures are voluntarily embraced,
the self-policing mechanisms that will thrive in the organization will be
more likely to expose wrongdoing in its infancy. Second, a culture where
rule following is the expected norm, and cynicism is low, will be a far less
comfortable environment for those who would prefer to break the rules.
Finally, in a culture where rule following is the accepted norm, scoundrels
and cheats will be far less likely to ascend to the positions of power in which
they can do significant damage.41
Successful compliance thus depends on the flourishing of shared cultural
norms between the organization and its individual workers.42
The bottom line of all of this research is that the success of
compliance may depend more on inculcating organizational norms (e.g.,
good faith adherence to organizational norms and lack of cynicism, among
others) than innovations in the technology of policing. This does not mean an
emphasis on organizational culture is always more successful than command-
and-control structures. But sometimes it is. An investment in culture is thus
an alternative to an investment in policing structures as a means of
influencing employee behavior.
Enforcement authorities have begun to take notice. The 2004 revision to
the Sentencing Guidelines takes organizational culture into account by
emphasizing, in addition to steps taken to detect and prevent misconduct,
corporate actions that “otherwise promote an organizational culture that
encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law.”43
The government thus acknowledges the importance of corporate culture in
compliance as a component of “effective” compliance programs. However,
the Sentencing Guidelines go on to suggest that “organizational culture” can
be demonstrated by the basic seven minimal requirements discussed above,
some if not all of which undermine corporate culture.44
More recently, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) has
been emphasizing the importance of “culture” in financial-institution
compliance. The FRBNY recently convened a workshop around the issue, at
which its President delivered remarks emphasizing the deep-seated cultural
and ethical failures of financial institutions and arguing that “improving
culture in the finance industry is also an imperative [for ensuring financial
stability].”45 Bank CEOs joined the chorus during panel sessions organized
41. Tyler, et al., supra note 40, at 43.
42. See id. at 1153 (describing how to promote shared cultural values through discussions at the
organizational and the individual work-group level).
43. U.S. SENTENCINGGUIDELINESMANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2011).
44. Id.; see also Paine, supra note 31, at 109 (expressly criticizing the Sentencing Guidelines as
“emphasiz[ing] the prevention of unlawful conduct, primarily by increasing surveillance and
control.”).
45. William C. Dudley, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks
at the Workshop on Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry (Oct. 20,
2014).
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around the theme.46 The General Counsel of the FRBNY, Thomas Baxter,
has also spoken regularly on the issue. At a recent event at Fordham Law
School, he emphasized the merger of culture and compliance. In his words:
One of the very exciting areas in compliance today relates to how a
company’s strong ethical culture can impact corporate behavior. One aspect
of this behavioral change relates to the greater tendency of corporate
constituents to follow the applicable rules when the culture is right. Looking
to the future, I envision we will see much more empirical research that
shows the benefits of merging ethics with compliance, and placing both in
the hands of a trusted corporate officer with a catchy new name – the chief
ethics and compliance officer. As we move to the next level, ethics and
compliance will increasingly become a part of a single program.47
As a result, the financial industry is being pushed by its principal regulators
to demonstrate a culture of compliance.
III. THE CONTRADICTION UNDERMINING COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS
The contradiction at the core of contemporary compliance programs is
that the inculcation of cultural norms is antithetical to pervasive policing.
Compliance programs built on culture ultimately depend on individual
autonomy—individual employees freely choosing the course of action that is
consistent with organizational values. Compliance programs built around
technological surveillance and other forms of policing ultimately depend on
authority—a hierarchical structure designed to ensure that everyone does
what they are supposed to do. Authority and autonomy, of course, are
antithetical.48 Designing compliance around either cultural norms or
technological surveillance thus presents a choice. Either may work, but
attempting to design a program around both means embedding an internal
contradiction.
Less abstractly, policing undermines culture by rupturing trust in the
organization and discouraging willing participation in its norms.49 Policing
treats its subjects as prospective criminals, but not all employees are
46. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., SUMMARY OF OCTOBER 20, 2014 WORKSHOP ON
REFORMING CULTURE AND BEHAVIOR IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 2–5 (2014),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/newsevents/events/banking/2014/Summary-
Culture-Workshop.pdf (summarizing workshop contributions).
47. Thomas C. Baxter, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Remarks at the Fordham Journal of Corporate Counsel & Financial Law Symposium (Feb. 9, 2015).
48. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 83, 103 (2004) (“The difficulty is that authority and accountability are ultimately
antithetical: one cannot have more of one without also having less of the other.”).
49. In addition to pervasive monitoring, policing may offend cultural norms built on individual
autonomy by use of deceit. Miriam Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance:
What Can We Learn from Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 554–55
(2008) (distinguishing between, “policing” and “governance” by emphasizing the role of deceit).
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prospective criminals. Having thus been treated unfairly, employees are more
willing to disregard organizational norms. This may lead to the
rationalization of transgressive behavior, as described by Todd Haugh:
[C]riminalized compliance imports many of the criminal law’s
delegitimizing features into the corporation—from vague and overlapping
rules, to aggressive and onerous monitoring, to inconsistent enforcement
and adjudication. Employees recognize this illegitimacy and incorporate it
into their own thought processes, thus creating an environment ripe for
rationalizations. Once rationalizations take hold, there is little stopping an
employee from committing an unethical or illegal act, regardless of the
compliance program in place.50
Undermining individual autonomy means reducing the willingness of
individuals to freely choose to adopt the norms of the organization, increasing
the likelihood of transgression, and therefore, the need to monitor their
behavior.
A compliance approach that focuses on surveillance and policing
employees will destroy employees’ faith in management.51 The 1999 study
by Trevino and co-authors came to the conclusion that “unquestioning
obedience to authority” and a management focus on “self-interest rather than
concern for employees” led to a breakdown of trust between employees and
management.52 Employees will be more likely to follow the rules if they
believe management’s authority to be legitimate.53 If management’s authority
is delegitimized by a policing approach to compliance, employees will be
more likely to commit ethical breaches.54 Employees will be more likely to
rationalize their wrongdoings and create excuses and justifications for their
behavior, if the social culture around them permits it.55
In contrast, if employees perceive their organization to be procedurally
just, they will be more likely to conform to those social norms that promote
rule following.56 If employees feel like management values their input, they
will view their relationship with management as a “social exchange” rather
than just an “economic exchange.”57 They will be more likely to “go beyond
their normal role requirements and report ethical problems to
50. Todd Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance 5 (Kelley Sch. of Bus., Research Paper
No. 16-28, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2752621.
51. See Paine, supra note 31, at 109.
52. Trevino et al., supra note 33, at 144.
53. See Tyler & Blader, supra note 36, at 1154.
54. See Trevino et al., supra note 33, at 142.
55. See Joseph Heath, Business Ethics and Moral Motivation: A Criminological Perspective, 83
J. BUS. ETHICS 595, 604 (2008) (discussing how social context and culture make excuses and
rationalization more appealing to wrongdoers).
56. See Linda Klebe Trevino & Gary R. Weaver, Organizational Justice and Ethics Program
“Follow-Through”: Influences on Employees’ Harmful and Helpful Behavior, 11 BUS. ETHICS Q.
651, 652 (2001).
57. Id. at 653.
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management.”58 Thus, compliance programs that focus on policing are
antithetical to promoting an organizational culture of procedural fairness and
rule following.
That policing undermines culture does not necessarily imply that it is an
inferior means of motivating employees. There may be some organizations—
particularly far-flung global corporations with relatively little organizational
cohesiveness—in which an investment in policing produces greater returns
than the same investment in culture. It does imply, however, that investments
in policing undermine investments in culture and vice versa. Investing in both
is thus internally contradictory—each investment has a tendency to cancel
the other out—yet that is precisely what enforcement authorities have pressed
organizations to do.
Monitoring and surveillance have been a basic element of every
“effective” compliance program since the first draft of the Sentencing
Guidelines,59 and now so is culture. Yet, by insisting on both culture and
policing, enforcement authorities are embedding a contradiction in
compliance. If technologized surveillance in particular and command-and-
control approaches more generally are inconsistent with the successful
cultivation of corporate culture, then programs that strive for both will likely
get neither. Worse, by insisting that all compliance programs be built around
this inherent contradiction, enforcement authorities are dooming compliance
programs to failure.
IV. HOW TO FIX THE PROBLEM
Enforcement authorities are the driving force behind the current structure
of compliance.60 As I have argued at length elsewhere, compliance is a de
facto mandate, through which the enforcement authority not only demands
that firms comply with the law, but also specifies how they must do it.61
Enforcers impose their vision of compliance through the strong incentives
created by the Sentencing Guidelines and the imposition, at settlement, of
specific compliance reforms.62 The enforcement authority is the architect of
58. Id.
59. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINESMANUAL § 8B2.1(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2011).
60. See Griffith, supra note 12, at 2083–84.
61. See id. at 2078 (“Compliance is a de facto government mandate imposed upon firms by
means of ex ante incentives, ex post enforcement tactics, and formal signaling efforts.”); see also
Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 961 (2009)
(“[R]egulation of compliance [is] firmly in the hands of the DOJ.”).
62. On the governance reforms in settlement agreements, see BRANDONGARRETT, TOOBIG TO
JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 65 (2014) (reporting on 255
deferred and nonprosecution agreements (DPAs/NPAs) from 2001 to 2012); Jennifer Arlen,
Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through Deferred Prosecution
Agreements 194 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 16-13, 2016) (concluding that the use of DPAs/NPAs are inconsistent with the
rule of law); Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through Non-
Prosecution 1–3 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,
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compliance and, as we have seen, the enforcement authority has built the
edifice on shaky ground.
Rather than seek to correct this error by decreasing the emphasis on
policing and increasing the emphasis on culture, a simpler solution is to leave
the problem to the organizations themselves. Let the enforcement authorities
enforce the law, but without creating special privileges and exemptions for
preconceived notions of “effective” compliance. Let them tell companies that
they must comply with the law, but not how they must do it. Companies, in
turn, would be free to design their own compliance programs according to
the idiosyncratic needs of each uniquely situated firm.
Rectifying the situation has two basic steps.63 First, the Sentencing
Guidelines would need to be amended to remove the promise of mitigated
penalties for companies with “effective” compliance programs.64 Companies
would still have a strong incentive to comply in order to avoid the penalty
associated with misconduct, but the compliance programs they would design
would be more organic, structured in a way that responds to the
organization’s specific situation, its unique culture, and other characteristics.
Second, prosecutors and enforcement authorities would need to stop
conditioning settlement on specific compliance reforms.65 Enforcement
authorities could continue to recognize a compliance program as well
designed, offering some discount or credit on the sanction in recognition of
this fact, but they should not start with a preconceived definition of what an
effective compliance program must be.66
That it is technically simple to separate the influence of enforcement
authorities from program design, however, does not mean that doing so
would be easy politically. Enforcement authorities may now be too invested
in evaluating compliance and recommending specific reforms simply to give
it up.67 Companies, for their part, have come to rely on the system of
Working Paper No. 16-04, 2016) (reporting on PDA agreements from 2008 through 2014 and
policing agency costs); Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993-2013, 70 BUS. LAW. 61
(2014) (reporting on publicly available DPAs/ NPAs from 1993 through 2013).
63. This might be technically easy, but perhaps would be politically unfeasible. A full account
of the politics of this choice is outside the scope of this Essay.
64. See ORWELL, supra note 26; O’Connor, supra note 27.
65. On this point, see also Arlen, supra note 62; Arlen & Kahan, supra note 62.
66. Interestingly, the U.S. Attorney’s Manual (the “Manual”) treats compliance in precisely this
way, refusing to provide a list of necessary characteristics of “effective” compliance programs in
connection with the charging decision. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’MANUAL § 9-28.800(B)
(U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 2008) (“The Department has no formulaic requirements regarding corporate
compliance programs.”). If anything, theManual increases prosecutorial discretion by adding “good
faith” to the list of things prosecutors may consider in assessing a program’s effectiveness. Id.
67. Consider, on this point, that the Department of Justice has hired a full-time “Compliance
Expert.” See Laura Jacobus, DOJ’s Andrew Weissmann and Hui Chen Talk Corporate Compliance
in Exclusive Interview, ETHICS&COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (Feb. 1, 2016, 9:58), https://www.ethics
.org/blogs/laura-jacobus/2016/02/01/doj-interview (describing the role of the DOJ’s compliance
expert).
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discounts and safe harbors that they receive from modeling their behavior on
the expectations of the enforcement authorities.68 Nevertheless, it is in the
long-term interests of both regulatory authorities and business for companies
to adopt programs that actually produce compliant behavior. Although it may
seem counterintuitive or even paradoxical, the best way to get such programs
may be for enforcement authorities to stop imposing their vision of program
design.
CONCLUSION
An ancient story illustrates the dangers of technology. A traveler,
meeting a gardener irrigating his crop one vessel of water at a time, stops to
explain how the gardener could build a draw-well to irrigate many ditches at
once. But the gardener reacts angrily, answering:
I have heard my teacher say that whoever uses machines does all his work
like a machine. He who does his work like a machine grows a heart like a
machine, and he who carries the heart of a machine in his breast loses his
simplicity. He who has lost his simplicity becomes unsure in the strivings
of his soul. Uncertainty in the strivings of the soul is something which does
not agree with honest sense. It is not that I do not know of such things; I am
ashamed to use them.69
It is no longer possible, if ever it was, to reject technology. But it is possible
to be awakened to the dangers posed by technology and, once awakened, to
remain on guard against them.70 The goal is to prevent technology from
constructing our worldview and blinding us to other manifestations of being.
The goal is to remain wary.
In the context of compliance, this wariness entails a degree of humility
about perfecting the compliance machine. Technology might improve
compliance in some ways, but it might impair or destroy it in others. The way
forward, for some organizations at least, might be wholly non-technological.
Firms cannot make this choice, however, as long as enforcement
authorities insist upon a rigid predetermined structure of compliance. The
way forward, therefore, requires allowing firms to determine their own
compliance structures. Once they are choosing for themselves, they can be
expected to choose the method that most effectively produces compliance.
This may involve a further investment in technology. Or, alternatively, it may
focus on building corporate culture by investing in rule legitimacy, willing
participation, and a set of shared beliefs within the firm. Or, again, it may
involve a combination of the two that fits the firm’s specific structure,
68. See generally Griffith, supra note 12, at 2085 (describing industry lobbying for compliance
as a mitigating factor at the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines).
69. WERNERHEISENBERG, THE PHYSICIST’SCONCEPTION OFNATURE 21 (Arnold J. Pomerans
trans., Hutchinson & Co. 1958).
70. See Blitz, supra note 2, at 75.
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history, and needs. In any event, it would not involve a program designed
around a set of specifications imposed upon the firm by the enforcement
authorities.
